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What Is Special About Marketing Organic Products? 
 
How Organic Assortment, Price, and Promotions Drive Retailer Performance 
 
Abstract 
Higher sales and margins are key goals for retailers promoting emerging products, such as 
organics, but little is known about their marketing effectiveness and their cross-effects on 
conventional product sales. Extant research reports conflicting results about price and 
promotional sensitivity for organic products and does not address the impact of organic 
assortment. This article calculates long-term own- and cross-elasticities of organic and 
conventional product sales in response to changes in assortment, price, and promotions. Using a 
rich data set of 56 categories, the authors test hypotheses on how different costs and benefits of 
organic products affect these elasticities. They find that enduring actions, such as assortment and 
regular price changes, have a higher elasticity for organics than for conventional products. In 
contrast with common wisdom, even “core” organic consumers are sensitive to these actions. 
Increasing organic assortment and promotion breadth yields higher profits for the total category, 
as do more frequent promotions on conventional products. Our category comparison yields 
specific advice as to where larger assortment, lower prices versus more and deeper promotions 
are most effective.  
 
 
Keywords: organic products, food marketing, empirical generalizations, cross-category, 
assortment, marketing mix, vector autoregressive models
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Faced with intense competition and razor-thin margins on mature products, retailers are 
constantly searching for the “next big thing”—that is, groups of products that attract 
customers to the store and also generate higher margins (CesIfo 2011). Such “emerging” 
product groups include deli, ready-to-serve entrées, health and wellness products (e.g., food 
supplements, weight loss bars), organic and natural foods (e.g., organic milk, natural yogurt), 
and private labels (Beverage Industry 2010; Drug Store News 2008; Food Marketing Institute 
2009). Often, these product groups are first bought by a small group of devoted customers 
and then spread to the general shopper population. This creates challenges for the retailer 
because emerging and mature products are often substitutes in the same category. Apart from 
assessing the effectiveness of emerging categories for their marketing programs, retailers 
need to understand the intracategory cross-effects of promotion activities and their impact on 
overall category and store performance (Progressive Grocer 2008).  
Nowadays, many retailers perceive a key opportunity in organic products, whose U.S. 
sales have grown 17%–21% each year, compared with 2%–4% growth in nonorganic 
(hereafter “conventional”) product sales (Progressive Grocer 2009). The Great Recession has 
not dampened this growth (Brandweek 2009), which may be furthered by the appointment of 
an organics expert to the U.S. Agriculture Department’s No. 2 post with a budget allocation 
of $50 million specifically to fund new organic initiatives. The majority of U.S. consumers 
eat organic products at least occasionally, and organic products are now available in over  
70% of traditional supermarkets, such as Kroger and Safeway (The Hartman Group 2008). 
Retailers hope that promoting organic products will increase total category margins and 
store revenues, in addition to enhancing stores’ long-term image, equity, and differentiated 
positioning (Chain Store Age 2009). Our interviews with retail managers of two large 
northeastern United States supermarkets revealed their belief that organic products will 
become more established, thus generating tangible benefits for retailers that are willing to 
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invest in them. However, key questions remain on where such investments pay off most and 
how they affect conventional product sales and retailers’ category and store performance.  
Current marketing literature is rich in how consumers make trade-offs among different 
conventional products in a category and how price and promotions affect such trade-offs 
(e.g., Bijmolt, Van Heerde, and Pieters 2005; Sethuraman and Srinivasan 2002). However, 
retailers are unsure about how these general findings apply to organic products, given the 
mixed evidence on price elasticity (from –9.73 in Glaser and Thompson [2000] to –.001 in 
Kiesel and Villas-Boas [2007]), the surprising recent findings on promotional elasticity 
(negative in Ngobo [2011]), and the absence of research on how organic assortment benefits 
organic sales, category margin, and store revenues. Conceptually, some studies predict higher 
own marketing elasticities for organics because of the high price premium over conventional 
products (Glaser and Thompson 2000; Verhoef 2005). In contrast, Ngobo (2011) postulates 
lower own marketing elasticities (even of an opposite sign to conventional products) because 
consumers associate low prices and promotions with low-quality and “popular” products, 
jeopardizing the special status of organics. Indeed, research has not even established that 
cross-elasticities with conventional products are asymmetric in favor of (higher-priced) 
organic products (e.g., Blattberg and Wisniewski 1989; Sethuraman and Srinivasan 2002). 
Violating this general rule, the only econometric analysis on the subject reports asymmetry in 
favor of conventional products (Glaser and Thompson 2000). Finally, survey-based research 
indicates that consumer response to organic product marketing may differ by category and 
consumer segment. What is lacking is a large-scale study of what this means for the 
effectiveness of marketing organic products in driving organic sales and retailer performance.  
Why might organics be “special” compared with other expensive products? Consumers 
state different motivations for buying and consuming organics, such as health, environment, 
and animal welfare concerns (Bourn and Prescott 2002; Fotopoulos and Krystallis 2002; 
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Makatouni 2002; Zanoli and Naspetti 2002). Consumers have also expressed skepticism 
whether these motivations can be fulfilled in mainstream supermarket chains, and researchers 
have questioned the use of traditional marketing actions to promote organics (Ngobo 2011). 
In this context, our specific research questions are as follows: 
1) What is the long-term own-effect of assortment, regular price, discount breadth and 
depth, and price specials for organic products versus conventional products? 
2) How does the marketing of organic products stimulate purchases across different 
levels of consumer organic usage (i.e., “core” organic vs. “noncore”)? 
3) How large are the cross-effects of organic product marketing activities on 
conventional product sales, and vice versa? 
4) Which types of conventional products (i.e., top-tier and second-tier national brands, 
private labels) are affected the most by marketing actions of organics, and vice versa? 
5) What is the effect of marketing organic products on category and store performance?  
On the basis of the perceived benefits and costs of organics, we propose that enduring 
retail actions (assortment and regular price) generate higher consumer response for organics 
than for conventional products, but temporary actions do not. Our analysis across 56 
categories identifies and quantifies how consumer response differs, which yields concrete 
insight for retailers into where and how to devote their marketing resources to increase 
category and store performance. In contrast with recent advice that retailers should keep 
organic prices high and avoid point-of-purchase promotions (e.g., Ngobo 2011), we find that 
organic sales increase strongly with lower regular prices, even for consumers with high 
intrinsic value for organics (the core organic segment). We also find substantial benefits of 
increasing organic assortment to overall category margin, especially in produce categories. In 
contrast with Glaser and Thompson (2000), we find that (price) promotions of conventional 
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products do little harm to organic product sales, thus offering specific guidelines to retailers 
on how to strike a balance between emerging and mature products. 
More generally, this article contributes to the burgeoning literature on the marketing and 
consumer adoption of sustainable/ethical products (e.g., Henderson and Arora 2009). 
Recently, issues pertaining to sustainability have received considerable attention not only 
from governmental agencies (e.g., U.S. Environmental Protection Agency green product 
programs) but also from firms (e.g., Clorox Green Works), which are investing considerable 
resources into the design and marketing of products or initiatives that create long-term 
societal value (e.g., Kotler 2011). Thus, implications from our research are germane to the 
design of programs that influence public policy, resource management, and health behavior. 
Research Background 
Organic Food Products at Conventional Retail Outlets 
Currently, consumers in the United States buy more organic products in traditional 
supermarkets than in other outlets (TABS 2012). At the same time, traditional supermarkets 
are increasingly promoting organic products through various in-store marketing programs 
(e.g., increasing variety, displays). Because organics have higher gross margins—30%–50% 
versus 20%–25% for conventional products (Oberholtzer, Green, and Lopez 2006; Roheim 
and D’Silva 2009)—promoting them should enhance total category profits and store 
revenues. However, academic literature has yet to verify such performance effects of 
marketing actions for organics, as it has focused instead on other supply-side and demand-
side issues (Thompson 1998). 
On the supply side, Dmitri and Oberholtzer (2009) find that organic farmers sometimes 
struggle to provide sufficient supply to keep up with the rapid growth in demand, and Ciu 
(2008) reports that some farmers have struggled to obtain the necessary certification to 
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market produce as organic. Finally, Tondel and Woods (2006) find that organic supply is 
becoming more competitive and efficient, lowering prices throughout the supply chain. 
On the demand side, previous research falls into three broad categories: (1) self-report 
surveys and interviews that uncover the motivations for consumers to buy organic products, 
and the category factors that favor organic adoption, (2) studies on product health claims and 
labeling, and (3) econometric analyses of how individual household characteristics and retail 
prices affect panelist demand for organic products and their reaction to marketing for organic 
products. We discuss these in turn. 
Why do Consumers buy Organic versus Conventional Products?  
Motivations for buying organics include health reasons, environmental concerns, nutritional 
value and taste (e.g., Bourn and Prescott 2002; Fotopoulos and Krystallis 2002; Zanoli and 
Naspetti 2002) as well as considerations regarding ethics and animal welfare (Makatouni 
2002).  Some consumers also acknowledge that social approval plays a role in them buying 
organic products (Grunert and Juhl 1995). Self-reported obstacles inhibiting the purchase of 
organic products are their low availability / distribution, their price premium and consumer 
lack of knowledge (Bonti-Ankomah and Yiridoe 2006). Consumers often start with organics 
in categories such as produce, meat, and dairy, where they perceive higher benefits from 
going organic (Oberholtzer, Green and Lopez 2006; OTA 2009a). 
How Does Product Labeling Affect Consumers Responses to Organic Products? 
Studies in marketing have analyzed the role of product/nutrition claims in consumer food 
choices. Kozup, Creyer, and Burton (2003) report that consumers’ positive attitudes toward 
products are enhanced when favorable nutritional (e.g., fortified with vitamins) or health 
(e.g., heart healthy) claims appear on the packaging. In the context of our study, organic 
product labeling and certification logos have been shown to play an important role in 
stimulating consumer appeal for organics. Using Rokeach’s (1968) theory of value and halo 
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effects (Han 1989), Bauer, Heinrich, and Schafer (2012) report that organic labeling results in 
a higher level of perceived healthfulness, hedonism, environmental friendliness, and food 
safety. Janssen and Hamm (2012) hypothesize that because organic products are credence 
goods, a high degree of uncertainty is associated with them, and appropriate labeling might 
mitigate this uncertainty. Given this, third-party certification is superior because consumers 
have greater trust in independent certifiers than private manufacturers. However, not all types 
of labels are perceived to be the same by consumers. Generic organic labels, which typically 
list the word “organic” on either the brand or the product description, do not elicit the same 
kind of trust that organic certification logos do (e.g., the USDA seal). Moreover, Janssen and 
Hamm (2012) find that well-known and trusted certification logos command the highest price 
premiums. Similar findings are reported by Kiesel and Villas-Boas (2007), who find that 
consumer response in the milk category is higher for certification (USDA) logos than for 
organic labels or other markers (e.g., rBGH free), especially after the National Organic 
Program went into effect.  
In this study, we consider organic products with the USDA seal (certification logo) and 
organic products without the USDA seal but with generic organic labels on the packages.  
How Do Consumers React to Retail Marketing Actions for Organic Products? 
A handful of studies use revealed data (typically scanner panel) to analyze how organic 
consumers react to retail prices. Glaser and Thompson (2000) report large price elasticity 
(between –3.63 and –9.73) for U.S. organic milk in the late 1990s. In contrast, Kiesel and 
Villas-Boas (2007) report small price elasticity (between –.001 and –.003) for U.S. organic 
milk in the 2000s. In the most recent study, based on French data, Ngobo (2011) finds that 
lower prices and wide distribution make shoppers less likely to buy organics up to a point; 
and concludes that organic products may be a poor fit for the typical marketing actions of 
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traditional retailers. In summary, the magnitude, and even the sign, of organic price elasticity 
remains an empirical question. 
An issue with these studies is their representativeness for all the shoppers at a mainstream 
retailer. Relying on a panel of households, they further restrict the panel to account for the 
paucity of organic purchase observations as opposed to the conventional ones. Thus, they 
focus on the core organic consumer segment while ignoring the noncore segment, whose 
purchase of organics represents a key opportunity and challenge for retailers. Moreover, most 
of the previous studies analyze a few, mostly similar categories. Finally, they do not analyze 
the effects of increasing organic assortment, which is a relatively costly and enduring 
decision for retailers. These limitations impede actionable insights into what marketing 
actions retailers can undertake and in which categories to increase overall retail performance 
(e.g., by increasing organic sales without decreasing conventional sales). 
 This article contributes to this research stream by quantifying the long-term own- and 
cross-elasticities of organics and conventional product groups using store data across 56 
categories spanning seven years. We next develop our hypotheses. 
Hypotheses Development 
We develop our hypotheses on the basis of consumers’ perceived benefits and costs of buying 
organic versus conventional products. Perceived benefits of buying organics include health, 
nutritional value, taste, animal welfare, ethics and environmental protection (e.g., Bourn and 
Prescott 2002; Fotopoulos and Krystallis 2002; Makatouni 2002; Zanoli and Naspetti 2002). 
However, buying organic products represents a cost to a mainstream retailer’s consumers 
because organic products are typically (1) more expensive than conventional products and (2) 
more difficult to find in the exact form, flavor, and quantity the consumer prefers (Michelsen 
et al. 1999). The former represents an out-of-pocket monetary cost, and the latter denotes a 
transaction cost to the consumer. Our key assertion is that consumers weigh the potential 
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benefits of organics by these costs, which are likely to endure throughout their future 
purchases of organic products. Indeed, assortments and regular prices are “sticky” compared 
with temporary actions such as displays, features, and promotions (Pauwels 2004). This 
assertion is grounded in previous literature on organics. 
A regular, diverse, and accessible supply of organic products is vital for inducing higher 
organic sales (Silverstone 1993). The wider the assortment of organics, the greater is the 
likelihood of the availability of specific flavors and/or package sizes, which creates more 
opportunities for customers to buy them (Aertsens, Mondelaers, and Huylenbroeck 2009). 
Reduced distribution would create more transaction costs, making it less worthwhile for the 
typical retailer’s consumer to buy them (Campo, Gijsbrechts, and Nisol 2000). Likewise, if 
consumers perceive the price of organics as high, they will be less willing to purchase them 
(Michelsen et al. 1999; Verhoef 2005; Zanoli and Naspetti 2002). Thus, organics capture a 
larger category share when their price premium over conventional products is relatively low 
(Wier et al. 2003).  
Would temporary actions such as price promotions, feature, and display have the same 
effect? They may if they represent a buying incentive as strong as assortment and regular 
price changes, with less potential for perceived quality erosion (Delvecchio, Henard, and 
Freling 2006). However, we assert that temporary actions will be less effective for organic 
products, which represent a more enduring involvement. Previous research has shown that 
consumers choose organics as a means of achieving important life values (Makatouni 2002). 
Therefore, consumers are likely to consider not just the costs and benefits at the current 
purchase situation (for which an organic product may be available at a low promotional price) 
but also the future likelihood that they can buy a suitable organic product at a reasonably low 
price. In sum, enlarging assortments and decreasing (regular) prices, but not increasing 
temporary promotions, should be more effective for organics than for conventional products.  
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H1: The long-term own-elasticity of sales to (a) assortment and (b) regular price is 
higher for organic products than for conventional products.  
The extent to which such enduring costs represent obstacles to buying organics should 
depend on the strength of a consumer’s conviction regarding the benefits of organic products. 
Although it is typically not cost-effective for mainstream retailers to survey all shoppers on 
this matter, they can infer such conviction from revealed preferences (i.e., the consumer’s 
general purchase patterns of organic products). Core organic consumers frequently buy 
organic products, revealing a higher intrinsic value for organic over conventional products. 
Previous research has shown that such consumers tend to be socially conscious (e.g., show 
higher environmentally orientation) and also exhibit a greater concern for their health (Zanoli 
and Naspetti 2002). Consumers with such values should be less sensitive to the enduring 
costs of limited assortment and the high price of organic versus conventional products in any 
specific category. In contrast, noncore organic consumers have little experience with organics 
in general. A limited assortment and/or high regular price may be key deterrents for buying a 
specific organic product. Thus, the lower intrinsic value of organics should translate into a 
higher sensitivity to regular price and assortment.  
H2: The long-term own-elasticity of organic product sales to (a) assortment and (b) 
regular price is lower for core organic consumers than for noncore organic consumers.  
Next to their intrinsic preference for organics, consumers’ sensitivity to organic 
marketing may also depend on the perceived cost/benefit trade-off in a specific category. 
Category-specific costs include the category’s expensiveness and share of the consumer’s 
wallet and the organic price premium (over conventional products). Moreover, perceived 
costs of trying new, expensive products are lower in impulse purchase categories, which 
should stimulate organic sales. Perceived benefits from buying organic are greater for 
products with higher purchase frequency and products that are directly related to taste, 
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environmental, animal welfare, and local farmer concerns (Fotopoulos and Krystallis 2002; 
Makatouni 2002). Such direct-from-the-farm categories include produce, dairy, meat, and 
poultry products (Davies, Titterington, and Cochrane 1995; Verhoef 2005). The health 
benefits of organic products are also more congruent with virtue products (connected with 
self-control goals) than with vice products, which provide immediate gratification 
(Wertenbroch 1998). Finally, storable products are visible longer at home to consumers (and 
their friends and family), which increases the salience of organic benefits. Note that previous 
literature has discussed the impact of such category characteristics only on organic appeal 
and sales (i.e., a main effect), not on consumer response to marketing in such categories. We 
expect that greater organic appeal in a category may also translate into higher consumer 
reactions to organic marketing in that category.  
When organic marketing activities succeed in raising organic sales, how will this affect 
the sales of conventional products in the same category? Consumers may simply add the 
organic product to their shopping basket (e.g., when a newly introduced organic product adds 
a salient attribute to the category) (Boatwright and Nunes 2001). Impulse-buy categories are 
especially prone to this behavior. In general, however, such “free lunch” for the retailer is 
unlikely: Consumers tend to focus on the perceived value of organic versus conventional 
products and thus substitute the conventional product with the organic product (Durham and 
Andrade 2005; Kiesel and Villas-Boas 2007). Thus, successfully promoting organic products 
should reduce demand for conventional products in the same category. 
Cross-elasticities with conventional products should be asymmetric in favor of higher-
priced organic products if, as we believe, the asymmetric price competition literature applies 
(Allenby and Rossi 1991; Blattberg and Wisniewski 1989; Kamakura and Russell 1989; 
Sethuraman and Srinivasan 2002; Sivakumar and Raj 1997). In addition, if organic products 
bestow intrinsic quality benefits to the consumer (e.g., provide health benefits, taste better), 
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switching back to conventional product would represent a loss in those benefits, which 
consumers aim to avoid (Bronnenberg and Watthieu 1996).  
H3: Long-term cross-effects are asymmetric; organic marketing activities hurt 
conventional products sales more than vice versa. 
 Finally, which type of conventional products should experience most harm from organic 
marketing activities? In addition to the price-tier effect (e.g., Nowlis and Simonson 2000), 
previous literature has shown that brands whose prices are closer have higher cross-price 
effects than brands that are priced farther apart (Sethuraman and Srinivasan 2002; 
Sethuraman, Srinivasan, and Kim 1999). Thus, we maintain that organic marketing activities 
will hurt sales most for brands that are more similar to organic brands in terms of expense —
first top-tier national brands, followed by second-tier national brands and private labels. 
Methodology 
Our research questions suggest a methodology for analyzing marketing effects on sales and 
aggregate retailer performance (sales revenues and profits), while accounting for potential 
marketing endogeneity. Therefore, we choose the persistence modeling approach (Dekimpe 
and Hanssens 1995), which has previously been applied to long-term marketing effectiveness 
for conventional products (e.g., Nijs et al. 2001; Pauwels, Hanssens, and Siddarth 2002), 
offering a basis for comparison. This approach involves four steps. First, unit root and 
cointegration tests investigate whether the performance and marketing variables are 
stationary, evolving, or cointegrated (Enders 2004; Johansen, Mosconi, and Nielsen 2000). 
Second, based on the test results, we estimate a vector autoregressive (VAR) model or a 
vector error correction (VEC) model (Dekimpe and Hanssens 1999). Third, we compute 
impulse response functions, which track the effect of a marketing variable on the 
performance variables of interest over time (Pesaran and Shin 1998). Fourth, we perform a 
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weighted least squares regression of the estimated long-term elasticities on the product 
category factors, using the inverse of their standard errors as weights (Srinivasan et al. 2004).  
 The econometric specifications are well documented in previous literature (e.g., Trusov, 
Bucklin, and Pauwels 2009). The researcher chooses (1) the endogenous variables that are 
explained by the model, (2) the exogenous variables that may affect the endogenous variables 
but are not themselves affected, and (3) the lag length (p), based on the Bayesian information 
criterion, which trades off prediction accuracy and model complexity. After model 
estimation, we perform the required diagnostic checks on the residuals (Franses 2005) and 
report on the explanatory power of each model. The VAR model has the general specification 
shown in Equation 1 for each category (e.g., Srinivasan et al. 2004): 
1
, 1,2....
P
t i t i t t
i
Y A Y X t T

       
,
 
(1) 
where Y is the vector of endogenous variables explained by its own past (thus, the term 
“vector autoregression”), A is the matrix of intercepts, X is the vector of exogenous variables 
(seasonal dummies, holiday1 dummies, and a time trend) to control for factors unrelated to 
marketing, and Σ is the full variance–covariance matrix of residuals. To address our research 
questions and run validation checks, we estimate VAR models with different variables in the 
Y vector of endogenous variables, as detailed in the Appendix.   
 We assess H1 and H3 in our sales model, which connects organic and conventional 
product sales with their respective marketing actions. Thus, the endogenous variables in the 
model are (1) the logarithm of assortment size, unit price, promotion breadth, promotion 
depth, and price specials, respectively, for organic and conventional products (marketing 
variables) and (2) the logarithm of volume sales for organic and conventional products 
(performance variables).  
                                                 
1
 The holidays are Easter, Memorial Day, Independence Day, Labor Day, Halloween, Thanksgiving and the 
week after Thanksgiving, Christmas, and New Year’s. 
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 We assess H2 by replacing the two performance variables with organic and conventional 
sales from the core organic and noncore organic segments. We assess which conventional 
brands are hurt most by replacing conventional sales and marketing variables with the 
corresponding variables of first-tier national brands, second-tier national brands, and private 
labels. To avoid overparameterization in this model, we use price and assortment and 
promotion breadth and depth separately as endogenous variables, while including the 
remaining marketing variables as exogenous. Finally, to analyze store performance, we 
replace the performance variables with category profits and store revenues. Further models 
investigate the robustness of our findings to, respectively, quadratic price effects, social 
influence, different definitions of “organic” products, and store heterogeneity.  
After VAR model estimation, we obtain long-term marketing elasticities through 
generalized impulse response functions (Pauwels, Hanssens, and Siddarth 2002). We 
calculate the “long-term marketing elasticity” (because we have a log-log model 
specification) as the cumulative effect (i.e., summing up all significant impulse response 
coefficients). Note that we do not recalibrate the model for insignificant impulse response 
values, as these are derived from the estimated coefficients (Pauwels 2004). In the final step, 
we use the estimated long-term marketing elasticities (LTE) in the weighted least squares 
regression (using the inverse of their standard errors as weights) to investigate how they are 
related to the category characteristics (Nijs et al. 2001; Srinivasan et al. 2004):  
i 0 1 2 3LTE = + +i k i iVIRTUE DMP PRODUCE Z         (2) 
We include in Equation 2 the virtue nature of the product (VIRTUE) and whether the category 
is of the type corresponding to dairy, meat, and poultry (DMP) or produce (PRODUCE). In 
addition, we include the characteristics related to category purchase frequency, storability, 
impulsivity, category expensiveness, market concentration, category share of consumer 
wallet, organic price premium (over conventional price), organic penetration (current base) 
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and organic growth rate, which may capture unobserved category-specific factors. We 
collectively refer to these variable as (the vector) Zi in Equation 2. Our operationalization of 
the category drivers appears in Table 1. 
----------- Insert Table 1 about here ---------- 
 In addition to persistence modeling, we examine the relations of interest with the Koyck 
model (Franses and Van Oest 2007), which allows for all same-week effects specified in the 
VAR model and for some dynamic marketing effects through autoregressive and moving 
average terms. Equation 3 shows the Koyck model for organic sales (Org_Volt):  
1 2 3 4 5 6
7 8 9 10 1 1 2 1
_ _ _ _ _ _ _
_ _ _ _ _
t t t t t t t
t t t t t t t
Org Vol Org GP Org PB Org PD Org PS Org Ast Con GP
Con PB Con PD Con PS Con Ast Org Vol
      
        
      
      
 
(3) 
The independent variables in the equation—Org_GPt, Org_PBt, Org_PDt, Org_PSt, Org_Astt  
and Con_GPt, Con_PBt, Con_PDt, Con_PSt, Con_Astt —refer to regular price, promotion 
breadth, promotion depth, price specials, and assortment for organic and conventional 
products, respectively. We estimate the same Koyck model specification with conventional 
product sales as the dependent variable. Maximum likelihood estimation yields the 
coefficient estimates for the models (Franses and Van Oest 2007). Compared with the VAR 
model, the Koyck model is more parsimonious but imposes exponential decay (versus more 
flexible dynamic effects, such as wear in and wear out), and the feedback effects among the 
performance and marketing variables are absent. The presence of such feedback effects is 
investigated with Granger causality tests (Granger 1969). 
Data  
The data come from a large retail chain in the northeastern United States that operates 75 
stores. The store-level data contain purchase transactions for volume sales, actual prices, and 
retailer/manufacturer discounts for each stockkeeping unit (SKU). In addition, we have data 
pertaining to the costs (or wholesale prices) for each SKU for the entire chain, which enables 
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us to calculate retailer gross profits. Using this information, we compile a data set that spans 
355 weeks (January 2004 to October 2010) across the 49 food and 7 nonfood categories (for 
detailed data description, see the Appendix).  
 We analyzed all food and nonfood categories in which the retailer had at least two 
organic SKUs. All food organic SKUs have the USDA seal, which is permitted for two 
classes of products: 100% Organic and (at least 95%) Organic (the seal is not permitted for 
two other classes, “Made with Organic Ingredients” and “Less than 70% Organic 
Ingredients”). In the case of nonfood products, USDA labeling is mostly absent, so we use 
the Organic and Made with Organic Ingredients classification instead. 
 Because the focal retailer follows a chain-level strategy with respect to assortment, 
pricing, and promotions, we decided to aggregate the data from the store level to the chain 
level, as well as from the SKU level to the product group (organic vs. conventional) level in 
each category. We operationalize weekly assortment as the number of unique SKUs the 
retailer carries. Price is operationalized as price per unit calculated for each SKU and then 
share weighted by the SKU market share using constant weights for each store (Pauwels and 
Srinivasan 2004). We define promotion breadth as the percentage of SKUs that are promoted 
in a given week for a given store. To obtain the promotion depth variable, we first calculate 
the per unit dollar discount, which is the difference between the promotion price and the 
regular price. We define the regular price as the average of the previous four nonpromoted 
prices (see Hendel and Nevo 2006). We then obtain the promotion depth as a percentage by 
dividing the unit dollar discount by the unit regular price. Price specials capture the feature 
and display activities and are set to 1 if a particular SKU is on a price special; we then 
aggregate them to the category level using constant weights for each store. We aggregate all 
the variables to the chain level using store sales as weights.  
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 In our analysis, we considered all organic and conventional SKUs. The focal retailer has 
actively marketed organics since 2004. The organic products are stocked both near the 
conventional products and in specially designated sections of the store (the retailer uses a mix 
of integration/separation strategies with respect to organics). Moreover, store features contain 
advertising for both organic and conventional products, and displays are used for both types 
of products throughout the store. Thus, consumers are exposed to the marketing activities of 
both organics and their conventional counterparts.  
 Marketing activity differs substantially for organic versus conventional products, but also 
across categories at the focal retailer. We find that product assortment for organics is 25% of 
that for conventional products, on average, with their largest assortment (both absolute and 
relative to conventional products) being in processed food categories (e.g., cereal, cracker, 
jams /jellies) and the smallest in produce. The gross prices for organics are higher than those 
of conventionals in each category, but this price premium varies substantially. Notably, 
conventional products experience more promotional activity: promotion breadth, depth, and 
frequency of price specials. Again, the differences between categories are striking; for 
example, organic products are on price specials quite often for dairy, produce, cereal, salad 
dressing, and jams/jellies. Retail margins are, on average, 25.18% higher for organics; this 
difference is the highest for frozen pizza and the lowest for grapes. Average annual growth 
rates for organic products are approximately 17.85% versus 2%–3% for conventional 
products, in line with U.S. trends during the analysis period (Organic Trade Association 
2009b). Organic penetration ranges from a high of 27.71% (greens: salad/others) to a low of 
.35% (cheese), while organic premium ranges from a high of 182.30% (eggs) to a low of 
5.72% (tomatoes). In general, organic premiums are high for dairy, meat, and poultry 
categories (e.g., eggs, beef, milk) and low for produce categories (e.g., tomatoes, lemons, 
grapefruits), which are dominated by generic rather than branded organics.  
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 Although store-level data have the benefit of covering all purchases, they do not allow us 
to distinguish between consumers who frequently buy organic products (the core organic 
segment) and those who do not (the noncore organic segment). To this end, we obtained 
panel data, which record individual transactions covering 95.4% of all purchases made at the 
retailer. The panel data cover the same period and categories as the store-level data. We 
group consumers into core and noncore segments according to their individual organic 
purchase histories. Our two classification alternatives are (1) a median split based on organic 
volume purchases in the category over the entire data duration and (2) a median split based 
on overall organic purchases at the retailer during the last 12 months (with four purchases as 
the threshold). We also use a nested logit model that consists of category incidence and 
product choice to differentiate between core and noncore organic consumers (see the 
Appendix). We randomly select 700 consumers in each category who make at least two 
purchases of organics for analysis. From the intercept term of product choice, which can be 
interpreted as consumers’ organic intrinsic preference, we classify them as belonging to core 
(higher than the mean intercept) or noncore (lower than the mean intercept) segments. Using 
these classifications and relevant variables, we conduct the VAR analysis separately for each 
segment. We calculate the long-term assortment and price elasticities on the basis of the 
segment-level VAR estimates. On comparison, we find that the elasticities obtained through 
the segment-level analysis using the nested logit and organic volume purchases are similar.   
Results 
We first relate the key variables in a median split for organic products sales share, the 
correlation matrix of main variables, and the analysis results of the Koyck model. We then 
discuss the analysis pertaining to the Granger causality, unit root, and cointegration tests. 
After reviewing model specifications and estimation, we present the substantive findings of 
the VAR models, which relate back to the hypotheses. 
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 Figure 1 compares organic premium, organic growth rates, category expensiveness, and 
frequency of purchase in a median split by organic sales share in the category. Categories 
with above-median organic sales share have a lower organic premium (47.06% vs. 51.84%) 
but a higher annual purchase frequency (9.89 vs. 7.28). We report both the overall and the 
specific correlations between top-tier and second-tier national brands, private labels of 
conventional products, and organic products in Table 2. As the table shows, conventional top-
tier brands have a higher correlation in sales and marketing actions with organic products 
than second-tier national brands and conventional private labels. This is consistent with our 
classification of organic products as top tier in the category.  
------- Insert Figure 1 around here ------- 
We begin with the Koyck model results (Table 3). We focus on the coefficients of 
interest: own- and cross-elasticities of organic versus conventional products for the five 
analyzed marketing actions. First, organic products have a higher own price elasticity (–3.00) 
than conventional products (–1.95), and the same holds for own assortment elasticity (2.63 
vs. 1.69). In contrast, own promotional elasticies are not significantly different for organic 
than conventional products. Second, the cross-elasticities indicate that promotional breadth 
and depth on organic products hurt conventional product sales more than vice versa. Other 
differences are not significantly different from zero. We next investigate dual causality in our 
data to gauge the need for a more complicated VAR model.  
----------- Insert Tables 2 and 3 about here ----------- 
Granger Causality Tests  
We focus on the Granger causality among organic and conventional product sales and retail 
marketing actions. First, the results (available on request) show that virtually all marketing 
activities Granger cause sales for the intended products (e.g., organic price on organic sales). 
Second, organic marketing actions Granger cause conventional product sales in 44% of 
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categories, while conventional marketing actions Granger cause organic product sales in 70% 
of categories. Third, organic marketing activities Granger cause conventional marketing in 
14% of all cases (43% for organic price Granger causing conventional price), while 
conventional marketing activities Granger cause organic marketing in 16% of all cases (52% 
for conventional price Granger causing organic price). Thus, the retailer shows some 
evidence of coordinating marketing across product groups. Finally, we find several cases of 
performance feedback (i.e., sales are Granger causing marketing for the same product group). 
In summary, the Granger causality tests confirm the dual causality loops among organic 
marketing, conventional marketing, and retailer performance captured by the VAR model.  
Model Specification Choices and Model Estimation 
Conventional product sales are evolving in only 3.6% of cases, consistent with previous 
research (Nijs et al. 2001; Srinivasan et al. 2004). In contrast, organic sales are evolving in 
8.9% of all cases. Moreover, sales are trend stationary (i.e., only stationary after we account 
for a deterministic time trend) for 33.9% of organic cases (16.07% of conventional cases). 
Such time trend may capture gradual gains in awareness/appeal of organics because of factors 
outside the retailer’s control (e.g., health concerns). In all cases of organic sales evolving or 
trending, the sales series is growing, while 41.6% of the conventional sales with evolution 
and time trend are declining. Thus, our data reflect the stronger growth in organic versus 
conventional product sales observed in the business press, but also indicate that such growth 
is not self-evident: Most organic sales series are mean stationary.  
 Cointegration is present among organic marketing and performance in 2.67% of cases and 
among conventional marketing and performance in .89% of cases. This rare occurrence of a 
long-term equilibrium between marketing and performance is consistent with previous 
research (e.g., Bronnenberg, Mahajan, and Vanhonacker 2000; Nijs et al. 2001; Srinivasan et 
al. 2004). We use the VEC specification in the case of cointegration and the VAR 
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specification either in levels or first differences otherwise. The optimal lag length of 1, 
selected by the Bayesian information criterion, yields a good model fit for all 
models/categories (average R
2 
= .80 and adj. R
2
 = .78) and is superior to that of the Koyck 
model in all cases. For example, in the case of organic and conventional volume sales, the 
adjusted R-squares for the VAR and Koyck models are .84 versus .72 and .81 versus .69. 
Substantive Findings from Impulse Response Analysis 
We focus on the long-term elasticities (Pauwels, Hanssens, and Siddarth 2002), observing 
that only 1.04% (organic) and .59% (conventional) of marketing–sales effects are permanent.2 
Long-term own sales elasticities. Table 4 displays the average elasticities across the 56 
analyzed categories, either without weighting (‘simple average’) or weighting the category 
results by the respective category’s contribution to the overall store revenues. 
------ Insert Table 4 and Figure 2 about here ----- 
In support of H1, the sales elasticities for assortment and regular price are significantly 
higher for organic than conventional products. In contrast, organic products do not enjoy 
higher sales elasticities for promotional activities. Figure 2 shows the impulse response graph 
for a representative category, tortilla chips. Note that product assortment effects show a 
similar over-time pattern for organic and conventional products, with a long wear out of 
approximately 30 weeks. The key difference is the size of the effect: three times as large for 
organic as for conventional products. In contrast, consumer reactions to regular price changes 
differ in both magnitude and pattern for organic versus conventional products. A regular price 
decrease only significantly benefits the average conventional tortilla chip product for 1 week, 
while it benefits the average organic tortilla chip for 28 weeks (four months). This pattern is 
                                                 
2
 To compare them with cases that show only temporary effects, we calculate the net present value of the 
permanent effect by using a weekly discount rate of .15%, after discussion with the retailer. We then add this net 
present value to the immediate and adjustment effects to calculate the total, long-term elasticity of the 
performance variable to the marketing action. We verify that our substantive results remain the same when 
ignoring these infrequent and small permanent effects. 
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consistent with our argument that consumers perceive a more enduring commitment to 
organic products; lowering the regular price induces higher sales for several months.   
How does the higher regular price elasticity for organics differ across segments? Table 5 
reports our results for the segment-level model based on organic loyalty, which we define 
using a median split of organic volume purchases. We obtain similar results when using other 
operationalizations. In support of H2, we find that the elasticities for the enduring activities 
are higher and significantly different for the noncore than the core segment.   
----------- Insert Table 5 about here ----------- 
As for category-specific costs and benefits, our second-stage analysis finds a higher 
sensitivity to organic promotions for products with high purchase frequency, of a virtue 
nature, and that come directly from the farm (produce, dairy, meat, and poultry). Second, 
product storability and impulsivity increase consumer sensitivity to product assortment. 
While deep promotions induce higher consumer response in storable and impulse-buy 
categories, regular price reductions are less effective. Third, expensive categories show lower 
consumer sensitivity to regular price and price specials for organic products. This indicates 
that the higher price of organics is not such an obstacle for buying organics in categories in 
which prices are generally high. Likewise, regular price sensitivity is lower in categories with 
a high organic price premium, indicating a higher willingness to pay for organics. Plausibly 
because of this high willingness to pay consumers are more responsive to assortment 
additions in categories with high price premium. Fourth, high organic penetration is 
associated with higher sensitivity to assortment and price, consistent with our finding of high 
sensitivity to these enduring actions by noncore consumers (who tend to constitute a larger 
part of organic buyers in categories with high organic penetration). Finally, retailers obtain 
higher organic sales benefits with promotions and price specials when organics are already 
growing strongly in the category. 
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 Long-term cross sales elasticities. We report the cross sales elasticities in the bottom 
panel of Table 4. In support of H3, we observe an asymmetry: Organic marketing activities 
hurt conventional product sales more than vice versa. These differences are significant at the 
5% level for promotion breadth and promotion depth. In Table 6, we report elasticities across 
the different combinations of conventional products and organics. As expected, we find that 
promoting organic products hurts top-tier national brands the most, followed by second-tier 
national brands and private labels of conventional products.  
----------- Insert Table 6 about here ----------- 
Overall retailer performance. In light of the large own- and small cross-elasticities of 
enlarging the organic assortment, this activity seems desirable if the retailer wants to increase 
sales of organics without hurting conventional product sales. Even in the case of 
cannibalization, the higher unit margin on organics may still increase overall category and 
store performance. Table 7 reports the results of our overall performance model. 
----------- Insert Table 7 about here ----------- 
Considering the long-term performance elasticities, we find that organic assortment and 
organic and conventional promotion breadth have a significant, positive effect on gross 
category profits. The long-term elasticities in this case are .47, .41, and .20, respectively. 
Compared with the same actions for conventional products, we find a significant category 
margin advantage for higher assortment and more frequent promotions on organic products 
(last column of Table 7). Do these activities also improve overall store revenues? We find 
few significant effects, consistent with previous promotion studies for conventional products 
(e.g., Srinivasan et al. 2004). The two exceptions are enlarging the organic assortment and 
decreasing organic regular prices in the category, which yield a long-term elasticity on store 
revenues of .19 and –.36, respectively. Again, these actions have higher store revenue 
elasticity for organic products than for conventional products. Regarding category-specific 
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factors driving overall retailer performance variables, we find that the gross category margin 
elasticity is significantly higher in produce categories for changes in organic assortment, 
regular price, and price specials.  
Long-term elasticities and organic product labeling. Given previous research on the 
importance of organic product labeling, we compare our results on products with the organic 
USDA seal with those labeled “organic” without the USDA seal and with those labeled 
“natural” (i.e., products that do not contain any artificial flavoring, color ingredients, 
chemical preservatives, or artificial or synthetic ingredients). We find that our substantive 
results hold when we combine organic products with and without the USDA seal as “organic 
product” in the analysis, with a similarly high power explaining sales (this model: R2 = .815; 
the main model for food categories: R
2
 = .790). However, using only the organic products 
without the USDA seal yields a lower explanatory power (R
2
 = .695) and effect estimates 
that, while directionally similar in many cases, are substantially lower than those for the 
organic product with the USDA seal (our main model). Finally, using “natural” products 
yields an even lower model fit (R
2
 = .515) and shows hardly any significant differences in 
own- and cross-elasticities between natural and conventional products (without any organic 
or natural claim). From these results, we conclude that organic labeling is quite important 
across categories, consistent with consumer decision-making literature on organic labeling. 
 Additional analyses. We perform several additional analyses to gain further insight 
into our main results. We check for quadratic price effects (as in Ngobo 2011) and find that 
they fail to improve model fit. We include a social influence variable from sampled 
consumers’ self-reports of such influence on their organic buying decisions. We find that the 
social influence variable is significant and improves the model fit, implying that it is a driver 
of organics. However, our substantive results hold after we control for social approval.   
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Our final robustness checks consider aggregation bias, store trade area characteristics, and 
changes over time. First, to check whether our results are sensitive to aggregation bias, we 
estimate the models on a store-by-store basis and compute the weighted mean using stores’ 
sales as weights; we find that the results are substantially similar. Second, to check the 
sensitivity of the results to store trade area characteristics, we conduct the same analyses for 
another chain operating in a geographically distinct area catering to a different clientele.3 We 
find similar results. Third, to check for changes over time, we estimate our main models on 
semiannual periods and fit a local trend model through the time variation in the estimates. No 
discernible over-time pattern appears, while regular price elasticity varies between –3.17 and 
–4.01 for organic products and –1.75 and –2.2 for conventional products. Thus, we find no 
evidence that our findings are sensitive to these potential issues. 
Discussion and Implications 
Buying organics represents a rather enduring commitment, which involves both transaction 
costs (finding organic products with the right flavor, size, and so on) and out-of-pocket costs 
(the price of organics). Therefore, lowering transaction and monetary costs by increasing the 
organic assortment and decreasing organics’ regular prices represents the enduring marketing 
actions most likely to induce consumers to buy organics. Our findings offer new insights into 
the ongoing debate on the place of organic products on the (mainstream) retail shelf. We 
distinguish implications for shopper response, manufacturer strategy, retailer marketing 
strategy, and policy makers and organics advocates. 
 First, we find that shoppers react differently to enduring marketing actions for organic 
versus conventional products. We observe these differences for both organic products with 
and without the USDA seal but not for “natural” products. Thus, labeling and branding do 
seem to play an important role, as both the USDA seal and organic branding yield sales 
                                                 
3
 This chain operates 90 stores in the Mid-Atlantic United States and does not compete with our focal chain. The 
clientele for this chain differs in terms of income, education, and ethnic composition and average store size. 
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benefits. Our distinction among consumer organic usage levels reveals that increasing 
assortments and reducing the regular price for organics is especially effective for noncore 
organic consumers but also stimulates purchase by core organic consumers. Such core 
organic consumers should therefore not be taken for granted: Although they have much 
experience buying and consuming organics, the greater perceived benefits do not mean that 
they will buy organics at any cost. A strategy of first getting consumers “hooked” on organics 
with low prices and then increasing prices seems ill-advised in light of our findings. 
 Second, manufacturers of top-tier national brands have the most to lose from organic 
product growth and thus should be the first in line to either develop their own organic 
products with brand names that are distinct from their own or acquire organic brands of 
smaller companies. The latter is advised for minimally processed products (produce, milk, 
yogurt, cereal), for which we find a higher sales impact for small/independent than large 
manufacturer brands in an additional analysis. 
 Third, mainstream retailers should consider increasing assortment and lowering regular 
prices, especially for the noncore organic segment, but also for the core organic segment. The 
highest return for such actions materializes for products with high purchase frequency, of a 
virtue nature, and that come directly from the farm (produce, dairy, meat, and poultry). In 
contrast, regular price reductions are less effective than deep promotions in storable and 
impulse-buy categories. Thus, retailers can keep the regular price a bit higher in such 
categories, while offering deep promotions to induce impulse buying and stockpiling.  
 Our study also has implications for policy makers, sustainability proponents, and 
advocates of organic products. In contrast with Ngobo (2011), we find that typical actions of 
mainstream retailers, such as broadening assortments and lowering prices, substantially 
increase sales of organics. However, these are enduring actions for the retailer, which thus are 
unlikely to be swayed by temporary subsidies. The full supply system should be considered: 
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It is easier for retailers to increase organic assortment and reduce regular prices if 
manufacturers of organic products do the same. Transparent certification is important in this 
regard: The USDA seal increases consumer response to marketing actions for organic 
products.  
Conclusion 
What makes marketing organics special in mainstream U.S. retail settings? Not as much 
as Ngobo (2011) implies: Reducing price and increasing price promotions and assortment 
strongly increase organic product sales in our large-scale analysis over 56 categories. 
Moreover, reducing prices on organic products hurts conventional product sales more than 
vice versa, consistent with the asymmetric price competition literature (Sethuraman and 
Srinivasan 2002). However, marketing organic products is special to the extent that retailers 
need enduring actions (assortment and regular price) to overcome the perceived costs of 
going organic, especially for shoppers with currently low intrinsic value for organic products. 
Increasing organic assortment is also superior to increasing conventional assortment in terms 
of category margin and store revenues.  
In light of recent contradictory findings, we note the large (negative) price elasticity of 
organic products in each of our 56 analyzed product categories. What might explain the 
difference between some of the results of our study and those of previous research? First, we 
base our analysis on data that also include transactions by customers who (almost) never buy 
organic products, whereas other studies focus solely on the core organic consumer. Indeed, 
we find that the core organic consumer is not as price sensitive as the noncore organic 
consumer. Second, we use more recent data in which the organic penetration is around 5%. 
Thus, we believe we are capturing a more current state of organic demand and supply 
characteristics. Industry reports confirm that organic sales have remained strong during the 
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recession, mostly because manufacturers and retailers decreased organic prices (Supermarket 
News 2011).  
Limitations of the current study include the absence of data on competing retailers’ 
marketing, actions by suppliers of organic products, category advertising, and consumer 
perceptions of the store and its organic offering. As in any econometric study, our focus was 
on the sign and size (i.e., the “what” and “how much”) of consumer purchase actions, not on 
the “why.” Further research should unravel the motivations behind these observed actions 
and generalize our findings to other retail settings. For example, we find little evidence that 
marketing organics can increase store revenues at the studied retailer. A more focused 
repositioning, even fully converting to organic products (e.g., Whole Foods), may be needed 
to achieve this.  
This study represents an important step forward in resolving the “balancing act between 
the old and the new” for conventional retailers (Progressive Grocer 2008). Our analysis 
implies that organic products are compatible with conventional retailers and marketing 
actions. With the inspiration from high-profile role models (e.g., Michelle Obama starting a 
White House organic garden) and the practical support of mainstream retailers, the future of 
organics looks healthy indeed.  
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TABLE 1 
Variable Operationalization for Long-Term Marketing Elasticities Regression Equation 
 
Variable Operationalization 
Virtue The virtue versus vice nature of the product category was labeled according to the 
classification in Hui, Bradlow, and Fader (2009), who use three independent 
judges for this purpose. 
Dairy, meat and 
poultry(DMP) 
A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for the categories of milk, creams, 
yogurt, eggs, butter, cheese, beef, chicken, and turkey and 0 otherwise. 
Produce A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for the produce categories of 
tomatoes, oranges, grapefruits, strawberries, peaches, potatoes, apples, carrots, 
ready-to-eat (packaged) salads, greens (unpackaged salad and others), onions, 
mushrooms, grapes, lemons and blueberries and 0 otherwise. 
Category 
frequency 
The average number of times per year the category is purchased. Using the 
procedure outlined previously, we select the households that buy in a category 
(h). For these households, we calculate the purchases made each year and then 
average across households and years.  
Storability  A dummy variable indicating whether the product is considered perishable or 
storable (e.g., Narasimhan, Neslin, and Sen 1996). 
Impulsivity A dummy variable indicating whether a product is typically associated with an 
impulse versus a planned purchase (e.g., Narasimhan, Neslin, and Sen 1996). 
Category 
expensiveness 
We first compute the regular price (using the method described in the main text) 
of each brand. The category-level measure is calculated by the market share 
weighted average of the regular prices of the brands in the category (see Raju 
1992). 
Market 
concentration  
We measure the category’s competitive structure by market concentration, 
following previous work in industrial organization and marketing (Bowman and 
Gatignon 1995), as the sum of the shares of the top-three brands in the category.  
Category wallet 
share 
This variable denotes the relative amount of money a consumer spends on a 
category and is calculated from the household basket data. We first randomly 
select a sample of 10,000 households that have a high loyalty to the chain. For 
these households, we extract all their basket transactions for the years 2004–
2007. From these baskets, we calculate the dollars spent on the category and the 
total dollar value of the baskets. The total wallet share is then obtained as the 
ratio of this. 
Organic 
premium 
The difference of the average organic and conventional price divided by the 
conventional price. 
Organic growth 
rate  
The percentage growth rate of the organics is calculated each quarter as the 
difference in the current quarter’s dollar sales and the previous quarter’s dollar 
sales divided by the previous quarter’s dollar sales. We then average across the 
data period. 
Organic 
penetration 
The dollar sales of the organic products divided by the total dollar sales of the 
category. 
Assortment The number of unique SKUs carried by the retailer. We begin from a chain-level 
file, which contains the comprehensive listing of all SKUs across all stores each 
week. We infer assortment additions by identifying new SKUs that have been 
added to the chain-level file each week and which obtained positive unit sales in 
any of the stores in the subsequent four weeks. To identify SKU deletions, we 
require that the SKU is dropped from this list and not have any sales in any of the 
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stores in the subsequent quarter. 
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TABLE 2 
Correlation Results  
 
A: Overall Organic and Conventional Sales (Share Weighted) 
 
 Con. 
Vol. 
Con.  
R.P. 
Con.  
P.B. 
Con.  
P.D. 
Con.  
P.S. 
Con. 
Ast. 
Org. 
Vol. 
Org. 
R.P. 
Org.  
P.B. 
Org.  
P.D. 
Org. 
P.S. 
Org. 
Ast. 
Con. 
Vol. 
1 -0.62 0.47 0.32 0.35 0.58 -0.23 0.18 -0.41 -0.31 -0.29 -0.03 
Con.  
R.P. 
 1 0.40 0.31 0.38 0.33 0.10 0.19 -0.20 -0.16 -0.30 0.18 
Con.  
P.B. 
  1 0.19 0.48 0.32 -0.20 0.42 -0.09 -0.04 -0.23 -0.14 
Con.  
P.D. 
   1 0.21 -0.03 0.15 0.24 -0.15 -0.07 -0.09 -0.10 
Con.  
P.S. 
    1 0.33 0.22 0.35 -0.06 -0.01 -0.09 -0.08 
Con. 
Ast. 
     1 -0.20 -0.18 -0.08 0.06 -0.13 0.17 
Org. 
Vol. 
      1 -0.70 0.09 0.45 0.16 0.65 
Org. 
R.P. 
       1 -0.04 -0.25 -0.21 0.51 
Org.  
P.B. 
        1 0.29 0.56 0.07 
Org.  
P.D. 
         1 0.45 0.15 
Org. 
P.S. 
          1 0.12 
Org. 
Ast. 
           1 
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B: Overall Sales for the Different Type of Conventionals and Organics (Share 
Weighted) 
 
 T.T. 
NB 
Vol. 
T.T. 
NB 
RP 
T.T. 
NB 
Ast. 
S.T. 
NB 
Vol. 
S.T. 
NB 
RP 
S.T. 
NB 
Ast. 
PL 
Vol. 
PL 
RP 
PL 
Ast. 
Org. 
Vol. 
Org. 
RP 
Org. 
Ast. 
T.T. 
NB 
Vol. 
1 -.63 .56 -.23 .21 -.20 -.18 .14 -.16 -.30 .28 -.25 
T.T. 
NB 
RP 
 1 .39 .23 .12 -.22 .16 .11 -.10 .27 .22 .24 
T.T. 
NB 
Ast. 
  1 -.16 -.17 .14 -.13 -.10 .09 -.24 -.20 .23 
S.T. 
NB 
Vol. 
   1 -.58 .47 -.23 .20 -.21 -.15 .12 -.18 
S.T. 
NB 
RP 
    1 .33 .21 .20 .25 .20 .19 .16 
S.T. 
NB 
Ast. 
     1 -.20 -.21 .16 -.17 -.18 .19 
PL 
Vol. 
      1 -.61 .53 -.13 .10 -.08 
PL 
RP 
       1 .14 .20 .12 .13 
PL 
Ast. 
        1 -.13 -.11 .17 
Org. 
Vol. 
         1 -.70 .65 
Org. 
RP 
          1 .51 
Org. 
Ast. 
           1 
 
Notes: NB = national brand, PL = private label, Org = organic, TT = top-tier, ST = second-tier, Vol = sales 
volume, RP = regular price, and Ast. = assortment.  
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TABLE 3 
Organic and Conventional Long-Term Elasticities Using Koyck Model for Overall Sales 
 
Own Sales Elasticities 
Variable Organic Conventiona
l 
Differenc
e 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval of 
Difference 
Percentage of 
Categories 
Significant 
Assortment 2.63 1.69 0.94 (0.68, 1.21) 62.5 
Regular price -3.00 -1.95 -1.05 (-1.39, -0.71) 71.4 
Promotion 
breadth 1.08 0.64 0.44 
(-0.09, 0.97) 21.4 
Promotion depth 0.59 0.50 0.09 (-0.32, 0.50) 14.2 
Price specials 0.68 0.75 -0.07 (-0.25, 0.10) 23.2 
      
Cross Sales Elasticities 
 Organic 
Marketing 
on  
Conventiona
l Volume 
Sales 
Conventiona
l Marketing 
on Organic 
Volume 
Sales 
Differenc
e 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval of 
Difference 
Percentage of 
Categories 
Significant 
Assortment -0.161 0.105 -0.27 (-0.56, 0.02) 33.9 
Regular price 0.795 0.568 0.227 (-0.12, 0.57) 39.2 
Promotion 
breadth -3.135 -1.735 -1.40 
(-1.79, 1.00) 
89.2 
Promotion depth -1.861 0.693 -2.550 (-2.34, -1.83) 75.0 
Price specials -0.937 -0.836 -0.10 (-0.31, 0.11) 25.0 
Notes: The values in bold indicate that zero does not belong to the 95% confidence interval. Thus, the 
elasticities are significantly different from each other at the 5% level. 
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TABLE 4 
Organic and Conventional Long-Term Elasticities for Overall Sales 
Own Sales Elasticities 
Variable Organic 
 
Conventional 
 
Weighted 
Differenc
e 
95% C.I. of 
Difference 
Percent of 
Categories 
Significant 
 
Weighted 
Mean 
Simple 
Mean Min Max 
Weighte
d 
Mean 
Simple 
Mean Min Max  
  
Assortment 3.17 3.03 -0.71 5.76 2.09 1.95 -0.98 4.57 1.08 (0.28, 1.88) 66.07 
Regular price -3.57 -3.46 -7.94 1.02 -1.95 -1.86 -4.15 1.93 -1.62 (-2.24, -0.99) 75.00 
Promotion 
breadth 1.56 1.65 -0.17 2.61 0.94 1.02 -0.36 2.91 0.62 
(-3.37, 4.51) 19.64 
Promotion depth 0.69 0.78 -0.06 2.92 0.62 0.77 -0.19 2.25 0.07 (-4.62, 4.76) 17.85 
Price specials 0.92 0.81 -0.35 1.90 1.73 1.81 -0.79 3.16 -0.81 (-7.62, 6.00) 25.00 
Cross Sales Elasticities 
 Organic Marketing on  
Conventional Volume Sales 
Conventional Marketing on 
Organic Volume Sales 
Weighted 
Differenc
e 
95% C.I. of 
Difference 
Percent of 
Categories 
Significant 
 Weighte
d 
Mean 
Simple 
Mean Min Max 
Weighte
d 
Mean 
Simple 
Mean Min Max  
 
 
Assortment -0.05 -0.16 -3.45 1.35 0.24 0.35 -0.12 0.94 -0.29 (-0.64, 0.056) 32.14 
Regular price 1.07 1.20 -0.91 3.92 0.18 0.28 -0.95 1.52 0.89 (-0.44, 2.22) 35.71 
Promotion 
breadth -5.01 -6.07 
-
12.04 2.92 -1.88 -1.93 -4.67 1.68 -3.13 
(-4.90, -1.35) 
85.71 
Promotion depth -1.53 -1.76 -3.86 0.48 0.39 0.51 -1.64 2.65 -1.92 (-2.91, -0.93) 71.43 
Price specials -1.51 -1.67 -4.48 2.28 -1.04 -0.38 -3.73 2.87 -0.47 (-0.98, 0.04) 21.43 
Notes: C.I. = confidence interval. The values in bold indicate that zero does not belong to the 95% confidence interval. Thus, the elasticities are significantly different from 
each other at the 5% level. 
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TABLE 5 
Elasticities for Organic Usage Segments  
Variable  Core Segment  Noncore Segment   
 
Weighte
d Mean 
Simple 
Mean Min 
Ma
x 
% 
+ 
% 
- 
Weighte
d 
Mean 
Simple 
Mean 
Min 
Ma
x 
% 
+ 
% 
- 
Weighted 
Differenc
e 
95% Confidence 
Interval of 
Difference 
Price 
elasticity 
-2.08 -1.94 -4.03 
1.4
2 
10.
7 
50.
0 
-4.01 -3.76 -9.15 
1.5
8 
8.9 
80.
3 
-1.93 (-2.49, -1.37) 
Assortmen
t elasticity 
1.29 1.18 -1.75 
3.8
5 
48.
2 
12.
5 
3.18 2.96 -0.98 
7.0
7 
82.
1 
5.4 1.89 (1.48, 2.29) 
Notes: The standard deviations are in parentheses. The values in bold indicate that zero does not belong to the 95% confidence interval. The percentages positive (% +) and 
negative (% –) are the percentage of categories in which the positive and negatives are significant, respectively.  
 
TABLE 6 
Cross Elasticities Between Different Conventional Types and Organics  
Variable  Top-Tier National Brands  Second -Tier National Brands Conventional Private Labels  
 Wtg. 
Mean 
Simple 
Mean Min 
Ma
x 
% 
+ 
% 
- 
Wtg. 
Mean 
Simple 
Mean Min 
Ma
x 
% 
+ 
% 
- 
Wtg. 
Mean 
Simple 
Mean Min Max 
% 
+ 
% 
- 
Organic 
assortment 
-0.17 
(0.08) 
-0.18 -0.67 0.0
8 
0.0 46.
4 
-0.04 
(0.02) 
-0.05 -0.10 0.0
2 
0 5.3 -0.02 
(0.005
) 
-0.024 -
0.039 
0.00
5 
0 58.
9 
Organic 
regular 
price 
1.14 
(0.49) 
1.45 -0.82 2.0
9 
62.
5 
5.4 0.76 
(0.24) 
0.87 -0.70 1.9
8 
64.
2 
10.7 0.58 
(0.22) 
0.67 -0.59 2.35 12.
5 
66.
1 
Organic 
promotion 
breadth 
-5.31 
(1.46) 
-5.09 -9.05 2.8
9 
10.
7 
75.
0 
-4.07 
(0.97) 
-3.86 -5.45 2.2
1 
12.
5 
73.2 -3.26 
(0.84) 
-2.98 -5.35 1.67 16.
1 
80.
3 
Organic 
promotion 
depth 
-1.73 
(0.43) 
-1.65 -2.92 0.7
2 
1.7 67.
8 
-1.25 
(0.53) 
-1.03 -3.02 1.8
7 
14.
3 
60.7 -0.85 
(0.39) 
-0.75 -2.26 0.92 17.
8 
71.
4 
Notes: The standard deviations are in parentheses. The percentages positive (% +) and negative (% –) are the percentage of categories in which the positive and negatives are significant, 
respectively.  
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TABLE 7 
Organic and Conventional Long-Term Elasticities of Overall Retailer Performance  
Own Sales Elasticities on Gross Category Profits 
Variable Organic Conventional Wtg.  
Diff. 
95%  
C.I.  
%  
Significan
t 
 Weighted 
Mean 
Simple 
Mean Min Max 
Weighted 
Mean 
Simple 
Mean Min Max  
  
Assortment 
0.47 (0.20) 0.40 (0.17) -0.25 1.19 0.22 (0.23) 
0.18 
(0.20) 
-0.30 0.90 0.25 (0.17, 0.33) 42.8 
Regular price -0.19 
(0.28) 
-0.17 
(0.23) 
-0.95 0.32 
-0.16 
(0.26) 
-
0.13(0.22) 
-0.75 0.45 -0.03 (-0.25, 0.19) 3.6 
Promotion breadth 0.41(0.18) 0.37(0.16) -0.13 0.97 0.20(0.08) 0.17(0.10) -0.13 0.71 0.21 (0.16, 0.26) 37.5 
Promotion depth 0.10 (0.26) 0.08 (0.29) -0.10 0.27 0.12 (0.22) 0.11(0.19) -0.16 0.45 -0.02 (-0.11, 0.07) 5.3 
Price specials -
0.005(0.19) 
-
0.003(0.22) 
-0.05 0.09 
0.003 
(0.13) 
0.004(0.11
) 
-0.04 0.07 
-
0.008 
(-0.07, 0.05) 0.0 
Own Sales Elasticities on Store Revenues 
Assortment 0.19 (0.07) 0.17(0.05) -0.27 0.85 0.09 (0.06) 0.05(0.05) -0.08 0.18 0.10 (0.08, 0.12) 17.8 
Regular price -0.36 
(0.16) 
-0.31(0.14) -1.97 0.61 
-0.20 
(0.15) 
-
0.17(0.13) 
-1.35 0.30 -0.16 (-0.21, -0.10) 39.2 
Promotion breadth 
0.07(0.22) 0.05(0.24) -0.11 0.15 0.09(0.20) 
0.07 
(0.18) 
-0.03 0.25 -0.02 (-0.10, 0.06) 1.7 
Promotion depth 
0.09 (0.13) 0.07(0.15) -0.05 0.17 0.10 (0.17) 
0.09 
(0.16) 
0.01 0.28 -0.01 (-0.07, 0.05) 1.7 
Price specials 
0.003(0.11) 0.001(0.12) -0.02 0.08 
0.003 
(0.09) 
0.002(0.10
) 
-0.00 0.07 0.00 (-0.04, 0.04) 0.0 
Notes: The standard deviations are in parentheses.
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FIGURE 1 
Category Characteristics by Median Split of Organic Sales Share 
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FIGURE 2 
Sales Response to Assortment and Price Changes for Organic Versus Conventional 
Products in the Tortilla Chips Category 
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APPENDIX 
Appendix A: Elasticity Calculations for Core and Noncore Consumers Based on 
Organic Intrinsic Preference 
 
We formulate the organic buying process using a nested logit model in which the consumer 
first decides to buy in the category and then decides to buy either the organic or the 
conventional product. 
 
Category Incidence 
Consumer h at time t is faced with the decision of whether to purchase in category k or not 
(i.e., category incidence), the utility of which is given as (e.g., Bucklin and Lattin 1991): 
1 2 3 4kht h h ht h ht h khtU Inv IncVal C         , (A1) 
where htInv , htIncVal , and hC are the inventory, inclusive value, and the consumption rate, 
respectively. We calculate inventory and consumption rates using the formula (e.g., Ailawadi 
et al. 2007) 
1ht ht ht htInv Inv q C    and 
( )
h
ht ht f
h ht
C
C Inv
C Inv
 
  
 
, 
where qht denotes the quantity purchased, Cht is the consumption of the household h at time t, 
and f is the parameter associated with the consumption flexibility.    
 
Product Choice 
Given incidence, consumer h at time t is faced with the choice of buying product i (organic or 
conventional), the utility of which is given by
 
 
1 2 3iht ih ih it ih it ihtV RP Assort       ,  (A2) 
where 1ih  is the intrinsic preference of the consumer to purchase the organic or the 
conventional product and 
itRP  and itAssort are regular price and assortment of the respective 
organic and conventional products. We use the standard identification restrictions to estimate 
the model using the no-buy and conventional category as the base case in the category 
incidence and product choice equations. 
 
Estimation 
We incorporate individual-level parameters whenever possible and use the simulated 
maximum likelihood estimation technique with Halton draws (Train 2003) for estimation. We 
run this estimation for 30 draws for each of the individual-level parameters.  
 
We randomly select 700 consumers in each category to estimate the aforementioned model. 
Note that the consumers in each category are distinct because different consumers exhibit 
different purchase patterns across the categories. On obtaining the estimates, we classify 
consumers by their organic intrinsic preference parameter ( 1ih ) in each of the 56 categories. 
Thus, consumers with above-mean values of 1ih  constitute the core segment, and those with 
below-mean values are the noncore segment. We obtain the individual-level parameters by 
making draws from the mean estimates and standard deviations (Train 2003) and averaging 
them. We use 10,000 draws for this purpose.  
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Using this classification and relevant variables, we conduct the VAR analysis separately for 
each segment across all 56 categories. We calculate the price and assortment elasticity using 
the impulse response functions. We compare our original approach of classifying consumers 
simply by their purchases (as we describe in the main part of the article) with the more 
involved method of classifying them by their organic intrinsic preference parameter (as we 
describe herein). We report in Table A1 the overall elasticity (simple average across 56 
categories used for analysis) as well as elasticities for some prototypical categories. As the 
table shows, the elasticities using either method do not significantly differ from each other. 
 
Table A1: Elasticities for the Core and Noncore Segments Based on Nested Logit and 
Number of Organic Volume Purchases 
Price Elasticity 
Category Nested Logit  Organic Volume Purchases  
 Overall 
Elasticity 
Core 
Segment 
Elasticity 
Noncore 
Segment 
Elasticity 
Overall 
Elasticity 
Core 
Segment 
Elasticity 
Noncore 
Segment 
Elasticity 
Overall Price  
Elasticity 
-3.15 -2.21 -3.90 -3.22 -2.27 -3.97 
Milk -3.45 -2.37 -4.35 -3.57 -2.29 -4.58 
Yogurt -2.48 -1.87 -3.03 -2.59 -1.84 -3.35 
Pasta sauce -2.31 -1.61 -3.23 -2.25 -1.50 -3.31 
Crackers -1.97 -1.31 -2.59 -2.07 -1.43 -2.67 
Pizza: Frozen -2.98 -2.02 -3.96 -2.96 -2.08 -3.85 
Cereal -2.85 -1.92 -3.82 -2.90 -2.01 -3.78 
Oats -2.37 -1.48 -3.17 -2.43 -1.62 -3.25 
Carrots -3.68 -2.76 -4.75 -3.83 -2.74 -4.99 
Strawberries -4.01 -2.79 -5.49 -4.19 -2.90 -5.61 
Laundry 
detergent 
-1.52 -1.15 -2.27 -1.75 -1.21 -2.25 
Assortment Elasticity 
Overall 
Assortment 
Elasticity 
2.31 1.32 3.07 2.40 1.35 3.12 
Milk 3.12 1.46 3.95 3.25 1.84 4.32 
Yogurt 3.29 1.87 4.66 3.43 1.90 4.97 
Pasta sauce 2.32 1.08 2.69 2.21 1.02 2.78 
Crackers 2.19 1.55 4.03 2.23 0.92 4.24 
Pizza: Frozen 2.15 1.06 2.31 2.42 1.29 3.08 
Cereal 1.62 0.98 2.54 1.74 1.09 3.03 
Oats 1.74 1.27 3.09 1.83 1.31 3.26 
Carrots 1.37 0.70 1.89 1.59 0.77 2.15 
Strawberries 1.35 0.87 1.96 1.39 0.95 2.33 
Laundry 
detergent 
1.44 0.78 2.09 1.61 0.97 2.38 
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Appendix B: Data and Model Specifics 
 
TABLE B1: Data Summary Statistics  
Category Mean Values of the Variables 
 Assort 
Size 
(Number) 
Gross Price 
(Cents/Unit) 
Promo. 
Breadth 
(Percent) 
Promo. 
Depth 
(Percent) 
Price Sp. 
Freq. 
(Percent) 
Retail 
Margins 
(Percent) 
Org. 
Grow. 
(%) 
Org. 
Pen. 
(%) 
Org. Pre-
mium 
(%) 
 O C O C O C O C O C O C    
Apple juice 10 52 16.17 9.03 34 66 9 23 13 23 61.9 56.05 16.7 6.35 79.07 
Apples 10 46 13.18 11.20 14 23 5 10 3 29 40.56 21.72 23.4 2.34 17.68 
Beef 14 50 72.37 43.71 11 27 7 35 6 33 35.54 32.9 58.1 2.01 65.57 
Blueberries 3 6 102.11 73.16 48 69 5 20 5 12 60.14 50.97 23.3 3.05 39.57 
Mac and cheese 9 23 23.61 18.79 52 75 8 17 2 17 44.96 38.27 22 13.79 25.65 
Butter 11 26 33.02 23.14 27 59 7 25 2 17 47.95 41.58 6 1.33 42.70 
Canned chick peas 5 17 11.08 7.14 28 42 6 11 4 9 43.56 30.82 16.7 4.62 55.18 
Canned green beans 5 13 11.14 8.14 15 33 7 22 1 3 55.12 52.56 25.2 1.65 36.86 
Canned kidney beans 4 8 9.60 7.96 36 38 6 13 1 7 38.02 35.32 20.3 7.51 20.60 
Canned tomato paste 5 27 10.20 7.87 25 55 3 17 1 7 39.4 31.12 14.5 1.59 29.61 
Carrots 8 18 13.35 11.46 24 28 16 25 9 11 55.54 41.64 45 18.13 16.49 
Cereal 99 346 31.29 24.25 31 39 5 18 18 55 53.7 40.8 14 3.44 29.03 
Cheese 23 100 53.31 29.15 12 16 3 17 1 29 46.07 32.25 23 0.35 82.88 
Chicken 8 41 30.16 16.13 31 27 17 37 2 36 55.16 34.7 32 1.57 86.98 
Conditioners 9 61 39.42 26.92 11 44 3 13 1 11 55.8 33.01 12.5 1.02 46.43 
Cookies 25 170 27.68 22.07 25 43 7 22 5 27 49.1 39.3 14.3 2.92 25.41 
Crackers 27 149 42.69 25.31 29 39 5 20 3 42 56.5 45.44 13.7 2.63 68.67 
Creams (dairy based) 7 19 40.60 27.85 22 30 10 37 2 9 96.78 85.42 7.5 1.95 45.78 
Diced tomatoes 9 44 11.25 7.06 27 47 4 15 12 38 39.79 35.11 9.2 1.55 59.35 
Dish detergent 7 29 12.71 10.41 9 37 5 15 1 12 45.51 30.03 5.7 2.85 22.09 
Eggs 8 27 17.22 6.10 54 33 4 11 27 20 60.6 50.17 7.9 2.38 182.30 
Fabric softener 8 28 14.70 11.97 6 21 3 16 1 10 39.33 30.83 6.1 1.97 22.81 
Grapefruits 3 11 8.73 7.48 3 13 3 8 1 6 49.34 45.89 55 1.48 16.71 
Grapes 5 20 20.76 18.67 30 65 10 30 7 25 53.47 51.78 18 1.44 11.19 
Greens: Salad/others 10 20 17.12 15.90 31 56 9 19 3 5 56.97 39.4 10.4 27.71 7.67 
Jams/jellies 37 89 23.15 10.82 17 19 8 10 11 34 66.01 52.05 15 1.9 113.96 
Ketchup 15 69 15.26 6.99 26 38 10 14 4 23 79 62.26 10 2.01 118.31 
Laundry detergent 19 75 10.65 7.92 22 47 9 20 2 17 43.8 29.2 8.4 3.07 34.47 
Lemons 2 5 60.02 49.97 12 33 17 17 2 15 56.12 45.27 21 4.54 20.11 
Milk 18 54 6.02 2.57 34 32 9 28 26 69 146.6 109.6 12 2.93 134.24 
Mouthwash 10 61 27.14 16.12 14 36 3 10 1 13 38.57 36.26 4.8 1.25 68.36 
Mushrooms 3 16 24.45 19.10 4 16 3 10 2 13 77.52 50.2 36 1.49 28.01 
Oats 29 76 22.55 17.47 17 32 6 16 7 41 76.05 56.83 18 1.92 29.08 
Onions 3 9 7.31 6.35 7 18 4 15 4 14 97.21 85.57 21 1.75 15.12 
Oranges 7 11 9.40 7.81 8 24 13 16 6 12 106.5 98.33 28 5.01 20.36 
Orange juice 7 59 6.27 5.19 26 31 19 25 6 43 102.2 82.56 18 7.64 20.81 
Pasta 36 142 12.47 8.56 18 26 12 20 2 19 71.9 65.9 6 1.26 45.68 
Pasta sauce 25 118 19.68 11.85 25 28 15 17 10 28 81.85 69.7 28 2.1 66.08 
Peaches 2 11 12.87 10.21 17 59 3 26 2 14 60.96 50.13 19 2.42 26.05 
Peanut butter 9 71 31.93 13.86 42 38 7 10 11 34 79.6 72.5 13 4.17 130.38 
Pizza: Frozen 17 79 44.42 25.14 14 19 7 17 3 33 143 87.46 4 1.75 76.69 
Potato chips 27 113 48.43 27.20 21 25 9 25 18 67 91.97 64.37 9 3.01 78.05 
Potatoes 7 50 6.67 5.12 13 34 4 20 9 17 51.46 48.08 16 2.03 30.27 
RTE Pack. salads 11 23 28.70 23.96 21 31 8 18 10 34 192.6 142.9 19 22.4 19.78 
RTD teas 37 107 15.92 13.37 19 29 15 27 11 24 45.34 39.78 12 3.57 19.07 
Salad dressing 29 134 27.45 16.93 25 27 17 21 14 33 56.77 53.2 18 1.59 62.14 
Sauces: Canned 37 116 31.65 22.69 20 33 12 17 10 26 82.79 62.27 22 1.39 39.49 
Shampoo 27 203 38.40 20.18 12 35 3 15 2 31 51.4 36.3 7.2 1.69 90.29 
Soup: Canned 49 254 16.93 12.04 21 27 7 29 9 52 44.06 41.31 8 0.75 40.61 
Soymilk 25 34 7.51 5.26 40 38 3 7 12 35 53.77 48.53 20 8.9 42.78 
Strawberries 3 13 26.12 24.70 47 53 12 31 16 34 47.97 45.48 53 3.06 5.75 
Toothpaste 26 136 95.98 52.95 11 38 8 18 2 41 45.81 31.35 8 1.37 81.27 
Tomatoes 5 11 19.76 18.69 19 22 11 20 19 29 87.9 78.43 19 3.89 5.72 
Tortilla chips 25 58 27.92 16.89 26 28 10 18 13 35 81.5 72.22 9 3.45 65.30 
Turkey 3 15 259.05 139.2 3 17 2 12 1 23 26.27 18.82 7 1.62 86.10 
Yogurt 28 71 13.64 10.17 37 22 7 20 17 26 51.23 26.66 10 2.67 34.12 
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TABLE B2: Description of the VAR/VEC Models Estimated 
Model 
No. 
Model 
 Description 
Endogenous 
Variables 
Exogenous 
Variables 
Comments 
PV=Performance Variables, MV=Marketing Variables, RP=Regular Price, PB=Promotion Breadth, PD=Promotion Depth, A=Assortment, 
PS=Price Specials, NB=National Brand, PL=Private Label, TT=Top Tier National Brands, ST=Second Tier National Brands, Org=Organics, 
Con=Conventionals (C is used in some cases as well) , CPL=Conventional Private Label). 
Models Used for Main Results 
1 
Overall sales interactions 
between Org vs. Con 
PV: Org Vol., Con. Vol. 
Seasonal and Holiday Dummies, 
Time Trend 
Store-level data on 
56 categories 
MV: Org RP, Org PB, Org PD, Org A, 
Org PS, Con RP, Con PB, Con PD, Con 
A, Con PS 
2 
Sales interactions between Org 
vs. Con for Core and Noncore 
Organic Segments. 
PV: Core Seg. Org Vol., Con. Vol. Seasonal and Holiday Dummies, 
Time Trend Panel data on 56 
categories  
MV: Org RP, Org PB, Org PD, Org A, 
Org PS, Con RP, Con PB, Con PD, Con 
A, Con PS 
3 
Overall sales interactions 
between top-tier NBs, second-
tier NBs, Con PLs and Org for 
Price and Assortments 
PV: TT Vol., ST Vol., CPL Vol., Org 
Vol. 
(either)TT PB, TT PD, TT PS, ST 
PB, ST PD, ST PS, CPL PB, CPL 
PD, CPL PS, Org PB, Org PD, Org 
PS (Or) TT RP,TT A,TT PS,ST 
RP, ST A, ST PS,CPL RP, CPL A, 
CPL PS, Org RP, Org A, Org PS 
Seasonal and Holiday Dummies, 
Time Trend 
Store-level data on 
38 categories.  No 
branding information 
for produce. The two 
models are estimated 
separately. 
MV: (either) TT RP, TT A, ST RP, ST 
A, CPL RP, CPL A, Org RP, Org A(or) 
TT PB, TT PD, ST PB, ST PD, CPL 
PB, CPL PD, Org PB, Org PD 
MV: TT PB, TT PD, ST PB, ST PD, 
CPL PB, CPL PD, Org PB, Org PD 
4 
Overall retailer performance 
effects vis-à-vis Org and Con 
PV: Store Revenues, Store Margins 
(Profits) 
Seasonal and Holiday Dummies, 
Time Trend 
Store-level data on 
56 categories 
MV: Org RP, Org PB, Org PD, Org A, 
Org PS, Con RP, Con PB, Con PD, Con 
A, Con PS 
5 
Overall sales (performance) 
between Org vs. Con analyzed 
with quadratic price gap 
 
PV: Org Vol. , Con. Vol. (Store 
Revenues, Store Margins) 
Seasonal and Holiday Dummies, 
Time Trend 
56 categories used. 
MV: Org RP, Org PB, Org PD, Org A, 
Org PS, Con RP, Con PB, Con PD, Con 
A, Con PS, (           )  
 
6 
Overall sales interactions 
between Org vs. Con analyzed 
with social influence for survey 
consumers 
PV: Org Vol. , Con. Vol. 
Seasonal and Holiday Dummies, 
Time Trend, Social Influence 
56 categories used. 
MV: Org RP, Org PB, Org PD, Org A, 
Org PS, Con RP, Con PB, Con PD, Con 
A, Con PS 
7 
Overall sales interactions 
between Org vs. Con with all 
types of organic products 
including 100% Organic and 
organic (at least 95%) 
 
PV: Org Vol. , Con. Vol.  
Seasonal and Holiday Dummies, 
Time Trend 
49 food categories 
used. The USDA 
seal is prominent 
only for foods. 
MV: Org RP, Org PB, Org PD, Org A, 
Org PS, Con RP, Con PB, Con PD, Con 
A, Con PS 
8 
Overall sales interactions 
between Org vs. Con for Org. 
with less than 70% organic 
ingredients and “Made with 
organic ingredients”-No USDA 
Seal  
PV: Org Vol. , Con. Vol. 
Seasonal and Holiday Dummies, 
Time Trend 
49 categories used. 
MV: Org RP, Org PB, Org PD, Org A, 
Org PS, Con RP, Con PB, Con PD, Con 
A, Con PS 
9 
Overall sales interactions 
between only natural products 
vs. Con 
 
PV: Nat Vol. , Con. Vol.  
Seasonal and Holiday Dummies, 
Time Trend 
49 categories used. MV: Nat RP, Nat PB, Nat PD, Nat A, 
Nat PS, Nat RP, Nat PB, Nat PD, Nat 
A, Nat PS 
10 
Overall sales (performance) 
interactions between Org vs. 
Con analyzed store-by store 
PV: Org Vol. , Con. Vol. (Store 
Revenues, Store Margins) 
Seasonal and Holiday Dummies, 
Time Trend 
56 categories used. 
 
 
